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Abstract
XSS (cross site scripting) is a type of a security vulnerability that permits injecting malicious code
into the client side of a web application. In the simplest situations, XSS vulnerabilities arise when a
web application includes the user input in the web output without due sanitization. Such simple XSS
vulnerabilities can be detected fairly reliably with blackbox scanners, which inject malicious payload
into sensitive parts of HTTP requests and look for the reflected values in the web output.
Contemporary blackbox scanners are not effective against stored XSS vulnerabilities, where the
malicious payload in an HTTP response originates from the database storage of the web application,
rather than from the associated HTTP request. Similarly, many blackbox scanners do not systematically
handle context-sensitive XSS vulnerabilities, where the user input is included in the web output after
a transformation that prevents the scanner from recognizing the original value, but does not sanitize
the value sufficiently. Among the combination of two basic data sources (stored vs reflected) and two
basic vulnerability patterns (context sensitive vs not so), only one is therefore tested systematically by
state-of-the-art blackbox scanners.
Our work focuses on systematic coverage of the three remaining combinations. We present a graybox
mechanism that extends a general purpose database to cooperate with our XSS scanner, reporting and
injecting the test inputs at the boundary between the database and the web application. Furthermore,
we design a mechanism for identifying the injected inputs in the web output even after encoding by the
web application, and check whether the encoding sanitizes the injected inputs correctly in the respective
browser context. We evaluate our approach on eight mature and technologically diverse web applications,
discovering previously unknown and exploitable XSS flaws in each of those applications.
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1 Introduction
XSS (cross site scripting) is a security flaw particular to web applications. XSS flaws arise when a web
application includes malicious input in the web output without due sanitization. When such output is
processed by the victim browser, the malicious input can change the application behavior, resulting in a
security attack. XSS flaws may permit a range of attack options, with the most severe being the ability to
execute arbitrary JavaScript inside the victim browser. This can in turn lead to serious security incidents
such as account hijacking.1 A recent report2 lists XSS as the most common vulnerability across most
surveyed industries.
To detect XSS vulnerabilities, an analyzer may adopt a whitebox or a blackbox approach. A whitebox
XSS analyzer can be employed when it is possible to track the flow of potentially malicious inputs through
the internals of the application [12, 13, 18, 29, 11, 26, 27]. In contrast, a blackbox XSS analyzer uses only
external application interfaces, looking for injected input in application output. As an advantage, blackbox
analysis can remain largely independent from the technology stack of the analyzed application [19], however,
limiting the analyzer to the external application interfaces typically brings lower recall [15].
In the last decade, blackbox XSS analyzers were shown to be ineffective against stored XSS flaws [8,
3, 21]. Compared to reflected XSS flaws 3, which return the malicious input in the response to the very
request that submitted it, stored XSS flaws trick the application into recording the malicious input in
persistent storage and returning it with some later response. Persistent input passes through increasingly
complex user interfaces with captchas, CSRF protection tokens, consistency checks and other mechanisms
that make it difficult for a blackbox XSS analyzer to successfully inject the test payload.
Our work is based on observing that most persistent user input ends up in a database, which is typically
a well-defined application component with a standard interface. An XSS analyzer can use this interface
for injecting the test payload while still remaining reasonably application independent – the database
component is often connected through a socket that uses a well-defined communication protocol, hence
intercepting the communication between the database and the application is technically close to intercepting
the external application communication. For a comparison of our graybox analyzer architecture with a
common blackbox XSS analyzer architecture, see Figure 1.
Strictly speaking, our approach is positioned between classical blackbox and whitebox analyses, as it
requires the web application to use a specific client-server database protocol. However, it does not perform
a classical graybox analysis, because we never access or modify the code that we analyze [5, 24, 1]. In
the context of web application testing, where the web applications are usually tested independently of the
database implementations, our approach is closer to blackbox analysis than to whitebox analysis.
Our graybox XSS analyzer combines classical HTTP parameter injection with injection to values fetched
from the database by the web application. For this purpose, we have designed a communication protocol
between the analyzer and the database and developed a prototype implementation of a database that
supports this protocol and injects values provided by the analyzer into the web application. We identify the
injected values in the HTML output using regular expression matching, taking care to also recognize values
1The Real Impact of Cross-Site Scripting:
https://www.dionach.com/blog/the-real-impact-of-cross-site-scripting
2The Hacker-Powered Security Report 2018:
https://www.hackerone.com/resources/hacker-powered-security-report
3Stored and reflected XSS attacks, OWASP:
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cross-site_Scripting_(XSS)#Stored_and_Reflected_XSS_Attacks
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Figure 1: Comparison of our graybox XSS analyzer architecture with classical blackbox XSS analyzer
architecture.
that were encoded by the web application. Afterwards, we parse the HTML output in order to compute
the browser contexts [26, 27, 23] of the injected values, and check whether the applied sanitizations are
compatible with those contexts. If not, we report an XSS vulnerability.
Our contributions are:
Database Traffic Interception. We introduce a mechanism through which the XSS analyzer can
cooperate with the database used by the web application under analysis. The database can inform the
analyzer about the values fetched by the application, and the analyzer can instruct the database to inject
a value into a specific database fetch. The value can later be tracked down in the HTML output.
Exploit Payload Identification. We describe how we use regular expression matching to find the
injected payload in the HTML output even when possibly encoded by the web application.
Browser Context Computation. We explain how we recursively parse the HTML output with our
simplified web browser model in order to determine the browser context of the injected payload, and how
we verify whether the encoding applied to the payload was sufficient for thus determined context.
Evaluation with XSS Flaw Discoveries. We demonstrate the usefulness of our XSS analyzer
prototype by analyzing eight mature applications written in five different programming languages and
serving diverse security-sensitive purposes. In addition to reporting correct and incorrect sanitization
counts, we also examine whether and how the discovered bugs can be exploited, provide performance metrics
for our analysis and compare the results with three popular state-of-the-art blackbox XSS scanners. Our
analyzer discovered previously unknown exploitable XSS vulnerabilities in each of the analyzed applications,
with the count and severity of the flaws differing significantly between the analyzed applications.
In Section 2 we describe the stored XSS flaws in more detail and discuss the complications that arise
when we use database traffic interception for XSS flaw detection. In Section 3 we explain the context-
sensitive XSS flaws and their relevance. Section 4 describes in more detail how our graybox XSS analyzer
works and how it cooperates with the database. In Section 5 we evaluate our approach on eight open source
applications and discuss the evaluation results. Finally, Section 6 discusses related work, and Section 7
3
closes the paper with concluding remarks and notes on future work.
2 Stored XSS Flaws and Database Traffic Interception
There are two basic XSS flaw types – reflected (or non-persistent) and stored (or persistent) 4. Reflected
XSS returns the unsafe client input immediately, in the HTTP response to the HTTP request that sub-
mitted the input, and therefore to the same client. A stored XSS flaw exists when the unsafe client input
is stored by the HTTP server in a persistent storage and returned later, in another HTTP response to
(possibly) another client.
The detection of stored XSS flaws is technically more complicated than the detection of reflected XSS
flaws, because the stored XSS flaws have a longer and more complicated dataflow path for the exploit
payload, and the malicious input can persist in the storage over many HTTP requests. By intercepting
the database fetches and injecting test payload, we can make the stored XSS flaw detection conceptually
as simple as the reflected XSS flaw detection, because we shorten the critical dataflow path to roughly the
same length and complexity. However, this technique brings three drawbacks related to analysis precision,
discussed below.
The first drawback rests with the fact that the database traffic interception interface may offer payload
injection opportunities that do not exist at the web application interface. Potential XSS flaws detected by
database traffic interception therefore require verifying the existence of the dataflow path from the web
application interface to the database, which the analysis bypasses. This verification may naturally lead
to a negative verdict, for example when the database stores a value that is hardcoded in the application
and therefore cannot be modified through the web interface, or when the value is sanitized by the web
application before it is stored in the database.
Common security strategies usually do not assume that the attacker has full write access to the database.
This may create the impression that using hardcoded or previously sanitized values from the database
without additional checks is fine, and that our analysis will inherently report a wide class of false positives
not exploitable using standard web application access methods. Our results demonstrate there are still
good reasons to consider all data coming from the database unsafe:
• The sanitization correctness depends on how the database value will be used. The code that stores
the value usually cannot easily deduce all eventual uses of the value, especially when those uses are
implemented in independent application components.
• Maintaining the safety of the database values over time represents an extra operational concern. In
particular, later extensions to the application can make originally hardcoded values modifiable.
• Relying on database value safety may amplify otherwise non-exploitable security flaws, such as an
SQL injection into an INSERT INTO or an UPDATE statement.
• Finally, the code-data separation paradigm suggests that even full write access to the database should
not grant the ability to execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the client browsers.
4Types of Cross-Site Scripting: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Types_of_Cross-Site_Scripting
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The second drawback of database traffic interception is that the injected values can be unrealistic, fail
to meet some consistency criteria or other expectations of the web application, and even make the web
application crash (to a lesser degree, HTTP request parameter injection is affected by the same issue). In
a reasonably designed web application such an error should typically impact only the processing of that
particular HTTP request, leading to the 500 HTTP response code or similar. Such a failure can lead to a
false negative but is not in principle prohibitive.
The issue may be exacerbated for those types of values that are more likely to affect application
control flow, such as configuration information. Section 4.2 details one of the performance optimizations
implemented in our approach, which restricts injection to those database fields whose content was previously
observed in the web application output. Configuration information and similar types of values are likely
outside this category, hence our optimization may also provide partial remedy on this point.
The third drawback concerns potential caching of either database or application responses. The cache
keys are usually derived from the request content. When the analysis injects the exploit payload into
requests, it obviously changes the cache keys and does not use the previously cached values. However,
response injection at database traffic level may leave the cache keys unchanged, leading to false alarms.
Our XSS flaw analysis should therefore be done with caching disabled.
3 Context-Sensitive XSS Flaws
Web applications defend against XSS flaws by sanitizing potentially malicious input. Importantly, saniti-
zation is not a one-size-fits-all operation, but instead must consider where the input will be used. Failure
to do so may lead to context-sensitive XSS flaws, which were shown to exist even in widely used web ap-
plications [26, 27]. Throughout the paper, we use the following running example, which illustrates context
sensitivity on this condensed JavaScript and PHP snippet:
1 Topic: <input id=" topic" name=" topic" />
2 <script >
3 function populateTopic(value) {
4 par = document.getElementById (" topic");
5 par.value = value;
6 }
7 </script >
8 <?php
9 $id = intval($_COOKIE [" SESSIONID "]);
10 $res = mysql_query (" SELECT ‘topic ‘ FROM ‘sessions ‘ WHERE id=". $id);
11 $topic = mysql_result($res , 0);
12 echo ’<a href ="#" onclick =" populateTopic (\’’;
13 echo htmlentities($topic , ENT_QUOTES);
14 echo ’\’);">Populate current topic </a>’;
15 ?>
In the PHP code on lines 9-14, the only potentially malicious input value use is on lines 10-13, where
a string value from the database (the topic column in the sessions table) is inserted into a JavaScript
string inside an onclick handler. Now assume that a malicious user, who can write into the topic column
in the sessions table, looks for a way to insert harmful code into the JavaScript content through this
input value.
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Essential to inserting harmful code is the ability to escape from the context of the string where the input
value resides. Here, this requires inserting the terminating quote character (other contexts may require
other characters such as < or &, we call these the context switching characters for short). However, both
single quote and double quote are replaced with their respective HTML entities, &#39; or &quot;, by the
htmlentities sanitizer on line 13. Therefore, the code snippet seems to be safe at the first glance.
The actual vulnerability rests with the fact that the whole onclick attribute value will first be HTML-
entity decoded by the client’s browser and only then passed to the JavaScript engine. The attacker can
insert for example this value into the topic column in the sessions table:
’+alert (" Hacked ")+’
The value will be encoded by the htmlentities sanitizer and appear in this form in the HTTP response
body:
&#39;+ alert(&quot;Hacked&quot;) +&#39;
The client’s browser will decode the HTML entities from the double-quoted HTML attribute value into
the original characters before passing the result to the JavaScript engine, which will therefore receive the
original input:
’+alert (" Hacked ")+’
Even though the terminating quote character was not visibly present in the HTTP response body, the
input still successfully breaks out of the single-quoted JavaScript string, and the attacker can execute arbi-
trary JavaScript code in the client’s browser as soon as the Populate current topic link is clicked. This
example demonstrates a (stored) context-sensitive XSS flaw, where the malicious XSS payload is incor-
rectly sanitized by the web application. The htmlentities sanitizer is sufficient for HTML double-quoted
attribute values which do not contain embedded JavaScript, but in this example a double sanitization, first
with addslashes and only then with htmlentities, was needed.
Detecting a context-sensitive XSS flaw is considerably more complicated than detecting a context-
insensitive XSS flaw, which appears when an input value is not sanitized at all. To detect a context-
insensitive XSS flaw, it is enough to check whether the injected input value appears unchanged in the web
application output. In contrast, to detect a context-sensitive XSS flaw, the analysis must also recognize
input values that were changed – encoded – in the web application output, and decide whether the encoding
is sufficient for the browser context where the value appears. This requires a more sophisticated input
tracking mechanism and an exhaustive parsing of the HTML document that constitutes the application
output. The issue is particularly relevant to blackbox XSS analyzers, whose insight into the data flow
inside the application is necessarily limited.
Among characteristics shared by both context-sensitive and stored XSS flaws is the fact that their
exploits are generally immune to automatic defense mechanisms employed by modern browsers. Browsers
based on Chromium 5 (e.g. Google Chrome) and some Microsoft browsers 6 provide an automatic XSS
protection that looks for unchanged input parameters in the HTML output and therefore prevents context-
insensitive reflected XSS attacks. Firefox provides the same functionality as an add-on 7. Modern web
5Chromium XSS Auditor: https://www.virtuesecurity.com/blog/understanding-xss-auditor
6Microsoft Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge XSS Filter: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/ie/2008/07/02/
ie8-security-part-iv-the-xss-filter
7NoScript Firefox Plugin: https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/noscript
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browsers thus only prevent XSS exploits of the class that is already systematically covered by state-of-
the-art blackbox XSS analyzers, making detection of context-sensitive or stored (or both) XSS flaws more
impactful.
4 Approach
The design of our graybox XSS analyzer starts with the classical mechanism used in the detection of
context-insensitive reflected XSS flaws, where the analyzer imitates a web browser. Before the analysis, the
analyzer is provided with a list of HTTP requests that exercise the web application under analysis (usually,
this list is constructed through automated crawling of the web application or by capturing HTTP traffic
generated by another web browser). Each request from this list is then analyzed separately – functionally
sensitive parts of the request are identified and mutated by injecting XSS exploit patterns, the modified
variations of the request are submitted to the web application, and the application output is checked for
the injected patterns. If any injected pattern appears in the output, an XSS flaw was just detected. Among
the functionally sensitive parts of the request are obviously the GET and POST parameter values, but also
the cookie values, or some HTTP header values such as Referer:.
4.1 Database Traffic Interception
Our graybox analyzer extends the traditional blackbox XSS analyzer functionality by injecting XSS exploit
patterns not only into the HTTP requests, but also into the database responses, which in our architecture
conceptually constitute additional application input. Technically, this requires solving two problems – first,
recognizing when and what data the application under analysis fetches from the database, and second,
injecting the exploit patterns into the database traffic, which is not controlled directly by the analyzer.
To overcome both obstacles, we have designed a database traffic interception protocol, executed between
the analyzer and the database, that can record the database activity and inject exploit payload into the
database responses.
• In request recording mode, the database carries out the application operations as usual, but also
reports all operations that fetch string values to the analyzer. We are only interested in operations
that fetch string values, because columns of date, numeric or boolean types cannot realistically carry
an XSS exploit payload. For each string fetch operation, the analyzer is informed about the name of
the table (if any, a fetch can also concern temporary tables), the name of the column, and the value
that was fetched.
• In response injection mode, the analyzer provides the database with an identification of fetch op-
erations whose result should be replaced by an exploit payload (three optional fields – table name,
column name, value fetched), and the actual payload to use instead of the value fetched. The database
examines all string fetch operations, and for those that match the specification, the exploit payload
is returned instead of the original value. Other application operations are carried out as usual.
With the database traffic interception functionality in place, the work of a classical blackbox analyzer
is extended as follows. For each original HTTP request, the analyzer puts the database in the request
recording mode and submits the original HTTP request to the application. In addition to the application
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response, the analyzer also collects the list of all string fetch operations as reported by the database. The
fetch operations are then treated as if they were just another kind of application input – the analyzer
puts the database in the response injection mode and for each string fetch operation observed, submits the
original HTTP request again while requesting the database to replace the result of that operation with an
exploit payload. The application responses are examined in the same way as with other exploit payload
injection operations.
In our running example from Section 3, the analyzer would first observe the fetch operation on line
10 in the request recording mode. In the response injection mode, the database would return the exploit
payload as the value of the topic column of the sessions table.
Including database inputs in the exploit injection increases the number of requests submitted to the
application. In practice, the number of distinct database input values consumed by the application when
processing a request can be several orders of magnitude higher than the number of HTTP parameters
of that request. Treating each database fetch operation separately would therefore require thousands of
additional HTTP requests, exceeding practical analysis time. We mitigate the problem by aggregated
response injection, which replaces multiple database values in the same request, for example all values
fetched from a specific table and column. However, thus reduced injection granularity can lead to false
negatives – it can reduce the code coverage and is more likely to trigger situations where the injected
exploit patterns crash the application under analysis. We evaluate the impact of different granularity
levels in Section 5.
Although our prototype uses an SQL database, our approach can also handle NoSQL databases – in
principle, the database traffic interception mechanism can treat string fields in a NoSQL exchange same as
it treats string columns in an SQL exchange. However, we did not evaluate our approach with a NoSQL
database, and suspect that some performance issues in our analysis may be more pronounced with NoSQL
databases than with SQL databases. In particular, a potentially more complex database schema would
further increase the number of database inputs that need to be intercepted.
4.2 Exploit Payload Identification
Essential to the analysis is the ability to identify the injected exploit payload in the HTTP responses.
Where most blackbox XSS analyzers look only for the unchanged payload, we also want to detect context-
sensitive XSS flaws. For that, we need to be able to identify the payload that was inserted into the response
body in an encoded form.
Our solution is based on the observation that realistic sanitization routines encode the special char-
acters that can escape browser context and therefore facilitate an exploit (depending on the context that
may include <, ", ’, &, :, \ and /), but leave base ASCII alphanumeric characters alone except for per-
haps changing the capitalization (these characters are harmless and very frequent, their encoding would
therefore needlessly bloat the application output size). Hence we construct an artificial exploit payload
from a mixture of special characters and base ASCII alphanumeric characters, and use regular expression
matching to identify the base ASCII alphanumeric character sequence used in the payload while skipping
over the (possibly encoded) special characters. By relying only on the base ASCII alphanumeric charac-
ters, we recognize the exploit payload even after it passes classical encoding algorithms such as HTML
entity encoding, URL encoding, JSON escaping, JavaScript literal encoding, CSS value encoding, quote
backslashing, and so on.
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Even though our artificial exploit payload construction does not produce working XSS exploit patterns,
it suffices for the analysis purposes because it exercises the sanitization functionality within the application.
The real-life exploit patterns presented throughout our paper are either examples or results of manual
analysis.
In detail, all our payloads look like abcdef<gh"ij’kl&mn:op\qr/stuv – the letters may differ but the
structure and the special characters stay the same (the random alphanumeric prefixes and suffixes reduce
the likelihood of erroneous greedy regular expression match). Given a string that constitutes the exploit
payload, we then generate the matching regular expression by replacing every base ASCII alphanumeric
character by a case insensitive match term (for example the (a|A) term for the a character), and by
replacing all other characters with a universal match term .*. To avoid performance issues with very
long greedy matches, we limit the match length to 20 characters in the match per one character in the
original payload. It is unlikely for the original payload to be encoded so heavily that encoding of any single
character would exceed 20 output characters.
As another performance optimization, we use the same regular expression matching mechanism to
limit database response injection. We look for the first 20 characters of each database input value in the
application output just before that value is intercepted, and only proceed with injecting the exploit payload
if the original value is found. If the original database input value does not appear in the output, there is
little point in replacing it, which dramatically reduces the number of necessary HTTP requests. The impact
of this optimization increases with finer database response injection granularity. The optimization does
not help with input strings that are either empty or contain very few base ASCII alphanumeric characters
(this should only impact analysis performance but not correctness), and may theoretically introduce false
negatives – however, for this to happen, the application would have to emit the exploit payload although
it did not emit the benign original value in the same place, which is unlikely.
If we use the abcdef<gh"ij’kl&mn:op\qr/stuv exploit payload in our running example from Section 3,
the code in line 13 will emit a HTML-entity encoded version, embedded in the surrounding HTML content:
<a href ="#" onclick =" populateTopic(’abcdef&lt;gh&quot;
ij &#039; kl&amp;mn:op\qr/stuv ’);">Populate current topic </a>
The regular expression derived from the payload, which matches on the HTML content, is:
(a|A)(b|B)(c|C)(d|D)(e|E)(f|F).{0 ,20}(g|G)(h|H).{0 ,20}
(i|I)(j|J).{0 ,20}(k|K)(l|L).{0 ,20}(m|M)(n|N).{0 ,20}
(o|O)(p|P).{0 ,20}(q|Q)(r|R).{0 ,20}(s|S)(t|T)(u|U)(v|V)
4.3 Recursive Output Parsing
After we receive the HTTP response to our mutated request and locate all instances of the injected exploit
payload using regular expression matching, we proceed to determine the browser context of each occurrence,
required for context sensitive analysis. As the first step, we replace each payload match with a unique
placeholder composed of lowercase alphabetical characters. We do this because the exploit payload may
have broken the document syntax, which might confuse subsequent parsing, and because we want to avoid
automatic decoding of the payload by the invoked parsers.
After the replacement, we essentially imitate a web browser by recursively parsing the HTTP body,
and record the context of each placeholder. In a manner similar to [27], we represent the context as an
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Position of the placeholder Detected sequence of syntax nodes
<p style="content:[PH];"> [0] HTML double-quoted attribute value,
[1] CSS property value
<b>[PH]</b> [0] HTML text
<input value=[PH]> [0] HTML unquoted attribute value
<a href=’javascript:call("[PH]");’> [0] HTML single-quoted attribute value,
[1] URI with javascript: scheme,
[2] JavaScript double-quoted string
Table 1: Examples of web-browser contexts represented by language-specific syntax node sequences
ordered sequence of language-specific syntax nodes (nodes that represent the individual syntactic elements
of the language grammar) in which the placeholder appeared. Examples of browser contexts are shown in
Table 1.
The process begins with running the HTML output through an HTML parser and looking for HTML
syntax nodes containing the placeholders, each recorded browser context therefore begins with an HTML
syntax node. If the placeholder appears inside an HTML syntax node that contains embedded content, we
decode and extract that embedded content, parse it with the appropriate parser depending on the content
language, and determine the encapsulated syntax node inside that embedded language. The placeholder
can again reside in an embedded content, in which case we proceed recursively – see the last example in
Table 1, where HTML embeds URI which embeds JavaScript. Our parsers process all widely supported
languages and their nesting with one exception – we do not attempt to recognize whether a JavaScript
string represents an HTML code snippet, URI or its part, CSS code, another JavaScript code (for example
in an eval statement) or none of these. Instead, we simply consider all JavaScript strings to be the
leaf syntax nodes that do not need further parsing. In reality, a JavaScript string can embed any other
language, but detecting such embedded languages is generally an undecidable problem. This makes our
context model incomplete, possibly leading to false negatives. As a future work, this functional gap can
be mitigated by static or dynamic data-flow analysis of the extracted JavaScript code.
The supported encapsulations of browser languages, parser invocations and decoding algorithms are
illustrated in Figure 2. In our running example from Section 3, the placeholder for the injected payload
would be located in a JavaScript context (the onclick attribute) nested in an HTML context (the response
body containing the a element).
As an alternative to explicit analysis of the HTTP body, one may consider opening the HTTP response
in a real browser, with an extension instrumenting the JavaScript function calls that the exploit payload
executes. This fails for multiple reasons, starting with the fact that this would require a universal injection
pattern (or a small set of such patterns) that can exploit any context-sensitive XSS flaw. There is no such
pattern – for example, the exploit described in Section 3 is useful for that particular context mismatch,
but it would be useless if the application were to use (also incorrectly) only the addslashes sanitizer. In
such case, a working exploit pattern would be:
"><script >alert(String.fromCharCode (72 ,97 ,99 ,107 ,101 ,100))</script ><
while the original exploit for the htmlentities sanitizer:
’+alert (" Hacked ")+’
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HTML parser
CSS parser JavaScript parser
<a href=”∎∎∎”>
<img src=’∎∎∎’>
<form action=∎∎∎>
….
javascript:∎∎∎
….
<style> </style>∎∎∎
<p style=”∎∎∎”>
….
<script> </script>∎∎∎
<button onclick=’∎∎∎’>
….
HTTP
response
body
 ∎∎∎ Passed unchanged
 ∎∎∎ HTML entity decoded
 ∎∎∎ CSS value decoded
 ∎∎∎ URL decoded
URI lexer
url(∎∎∎)
@import(∎∎∎)
….
<script type="text/template"> </script>∎∎∎
<script type=’text/django-form-template’> </script>∎∎∎
….
Figure 2: Parsers used by our web-browser model and their possible invocations.
would have been made harmless by the addslashes sanitizer alone – it would simply break the
JavaScript syntax by inserting a backslash in front of every single and double quote. In general, every
exploitable pair of sanitization and browser context requires a different exploit technique.
As another obstacle to using a real browser, many XSS exploits end up in javascript: URIs or
JavaScript onevent handlers. These are not executed immediately after the page load, but require addi-
tional user interaction. We need to identify these opportunities automatically, but we cannot automatically
test all possible user interactions (at least not unless we resort to model checking with all its implementa-
tion and scaling issues). The same goes for constrained attacks such as parameter tampering, where the
exploit does not execute a JavaScript function.
Finally, explicit analysis of the HTTP body makes it possible to detect XSS flaws that are exploitable
only for some browsers – for example the -moz-binding injections of JavaScript into CSS8 work only with
some versions of Firefox and other browsers based on Gecko, other browsers are immune.
4.4 Payload Encoding Verification
At this stage of the analysis process, we have located all instances of the encoded exploit payload in the
web application output and recorded their browser context. Furthermore, we have made sure that the
exploit payload contains all typical browser context switching characters – <, ", ’, &, :, \ and / – glued
together with randomly generated alphabetical strings.
8Moz-binding XSS fun, The Spanner, 2008: http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2008/02/04/moz-binding-xss-fun
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Syntax node Escape condition
HTML text Contains < character
Double-quoted HTML attribute value Contains " character
Single-quoted HTML attribute value Contains ’ character
HTML data
Contains < character and also /
character not preceded by a
backslash
URI
Contains : character if the
placeholder was at the beginning
of the URL or
& character if it was elsewhere
Double-quoted JavaScript string literal
After removing all JavaScript literal
escape sequences contains "
character or \ character
Single-quoted JavaScript string literal
After removing all JavaScript literal
escape sequences contains ’
character or \ character
Double-quoted CSS string
After removing all CSS escape
sequences contains " character or \
character
Single-quoted CSS string
After removing all CSS escape
sequences contains ’ character or \
character
All other syntax nodes True
Table 2: Escape conditions indicating security flaw in given language-specific syntax node.
Syntax node Decoding algorithm
HTML text None (always leaf syntax node)
Double-quoted HTML attribute value HTML entity decoding
Single-quoted HTML attribute value HTML entity decoding
HTML data None (kept identical)
URI URL decoding
Double-quoted JavaScript string literal None (always leaf syntax node)
Single-quoted JavaScript string literal None (always leaf syntax node)
Double-quoted CSS string CSS-value decoding
Single-quoted CSS string CSS-value decoding
All other syntax nodes None (always leaf syntax node)
Table 3: Decoding applied to content in language-specific syntax node.
To determine whether the exploit payload was sufficiently sanitized, we simulate the individual browser
decoding steps on the payload from the outermost to the innermost syntax node (thus beginning with an
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HTML syntax node). At each step, we consult a list of language-specific escape conditions in Table 2 for
that syntax node and report an XSS flaw if the escaping condition is true. If not, we apply a language-
specific decoding algorithm from the list in Table 3 and proceed to the next syntax node. If the syntax node
is not on our list (such as an HTML tag name or a JavaScript variable name), we immediately report a
potential XSS flaw and resort to manual analysis. This approach is in line with OWASP recommendations 9
and with the fact that sanitization in non-standard browser contexts is often error-prone.
We further refine the classification by looking at how the discovered bugs can be exploited. We report
an XSS flaw that does not permit JavaScript execution for a payload that escapes into a URL value but
not at its beginning – such flaws permit only parameter tampering 10. Based on our experience and on
other sources [31], this XSS flaw pattern is the most frequent one in existing applications. We report an
XSS flaw that possibly permits arbitrary JavaScript execution when a JavaScript string contains only an
unescaped backslash character – such flaws can always break syntax and thus cause denial of service, but
are usually not exploitable towards arbitrary JavaScript execution. All other flaws are reported as flaws
that permit arbitrary JavaScript execution – in our experience such flaws can either be exploited to execute
arbitrary JavaScript or occur very rarely and are thus worthy of manual analysis.
Returning for the last time to our running example from Section 3, recall that the exploit payload was
located in a single-quoted JavaScript literal nested in a double-quoted HTML attribute value:
<a href ="#" onclick =" populateTopic(’abcdef&lt;gh&quot;
ij &#039; kl&amp;mn:op\qr/stuv ’);">Populate current topic </a>
We therefore first check whether the payload contains the " character, whose presence would indicate
the attacker is able to prematurely terminate the attribute value string and escape the HTML attribute
value context. It does not, we therefore decode the value as HTML entity:
populateTopic(’abcdef <gh"ij ’kl&mn:op\qr/stuv ’);
We next check whether the decoded payload contains the ’ or \ characters. It does, both, hence we
report an XSS flaw that permits arbitrary JavaScript execution. An end-to-end overview of the steps is
displayed in Figure 3.
4.5 Prototype Implementation
We have implemented our prototype graybox analyzer as a plugin for the OWASP Zed Attack Proxy
(ZAP).11 For HTML parsing, we have extended the Jsoup parser 12 to distinguish between single-quoted,
double-quoted and unquoted HTML attribute values. For the parsing of CSS sheets and declarations,
we have similarly extended the SteadyState CSS parser 13 to differentiate between single-quoted, double-
quoted and unquoted CSS strings and URI values. We have used Rhino 14 for parsing Javascript, here
the distinction between single-quoted and double-quoted string literals is already supported. Finally, we
have implemented the URI lexer from scratch. We note that the exact choice of parsers may affect the
9XSS (Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet, OWASP:
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet
10Parameter Tampering: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Web_Parameter_Tampering
11The OWASP Zed Attack Proxy: https://www.zaproxy.org
12jsoup: Java HTML Parser: https://jsoup.org
13CSS Parser: http://cssparser.sourceforge.net
14Rhino: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Projects/Rhino
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Web application
1. Scanner initiates request
recording mode.
2. Scanner issues the
HTTP request.
3. Application reads
value from the
`topic` column.
4. Database reports read
access to `topic` to scanner.
Web application
7. Application reads
value from the `topic`
column again.
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exploit payload.
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                          Request interception phase
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DatabaseScanner
Scanner
                          Request recording phase
Figure 3: XSS flaw detection algorithm applied to the running example from Section 3.
analysis results especially where subtle differences in treating potentially malformed content are concerned,
however, our results show that the prototype implementation suffices to evaluate the approach.
As the general purpose database connected to the analyzer we have extended MariaDB,15 a binary
replacement to MySQL. We instrument the string fetch operations in the MariaDB network protocol han-
dler,16 that is, the insertion of MYSQL TYPE VARCHAR, MYSQL TYPE VAR STRING and MYSQL TYPE STRING
15MariaDB.org: Supporting Continuity and Open Collaboration: https://mariadb.org
16COM QUERY command, MariaDB: https://mariadb.com/kb/en/library/com_query/
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values into the ResultSet17 server packet. Therefore, our prototype is compatible with every web appli-
cation that supports the MySQL client-server protocol18 as a client. MySQL (together with MariaDB) is
currently probably the most popular DB architecture 19.
For readers interested in technical details of our prototype implementation, we provide complete source
code of all the patches made to ZAP, MariaDB, Jsoup and the SteadyState CSS parser20 21 22 23 24.
5 Evaluation
To evaluate our approach in sufficiently challenging conditions, we have decided to aim for more mature
applications. While this may bias our selection towards older coding practices, we want to avoid applica-
tions that only had short time to be scrutinized by security tools and security experts. Specifically, we have
considered applications that are 1) open-source, 2) developed for at least five years, 3) actively maintained,
4) designed to handle security-sensitive data and 5) have at least one thousand publicly registered users
of their code. Section 5.4 shows that even these precautions were not entirely sufficient to avoid flaws
automatically detectable by state-of-the-art tools, however, at least half of the selected applications did
appear flaw-free. We have also considered making apples-to-apples comparison on some of the applications
used for evaluation by authors of related work in Section 6, however, these use much older code than
our selected applications. Web application technologies change very rapidly and an evaluation using ap-
plications that, by now, may not even run, has little practical value. For similar reasons, we have avoided
synthetic benchmarks with artificially created security flaws.
From the applications matching all five criteria, we picked eight applications in order to cover various
security-relevant use cases and various technologies. Our picks are (A1) Joomla,25 a general-purpose CMS
written in PHP, (A2) OrchardCMS,26 formerly called Microsoft Oxite, a blog engine written in ASP.NET
MVC, (A3) SuiteCRM,27 an open-source fork of SugarCRM, a bussiness-data management CRM written
in PHP, (A4) Fat Free CRM,28 a general-purpose CRM written in Ruby on Rails, (A5) OpenEMR,29 an
ONC Complete Ambulatory EHR certified health record management CMS written in PHP, (A6) Jeesite,30
a software development CMS written in JSP and Java, (A7) PrestaShop,31 an on-line shop CMS written
in PHP and (A8) Mezannine,32 a general purpose CMS written in Django and Python.
17Server response packet ResultSet, MariaDB: https://mariadb.com/kb/en/library/resultset/
18MySQL Client/Server Protocol, MySQL: https://dev.mysql.com/doc/internals/en/client-server-protocol.html
19Most popular databases in 2018 according to StackOverflow survey:
https://www.eversql.com/most-popular-databases-in-2018-according-to-stackoverflow-survey/
20https://bit.ly/2V16dN7
21https://bit.ly/2USLAm6
22https://bit.ly/2E9FiZH
23https://bit.ly/2S31nNm
24https://bit.ly/2BA4OFU
25Joomla Content Management System: https://www.joomla.org
26Orchard CMS: http://orchardproject.net
27SuiteCRM, Open Source CRM for The World: https://suitecrm.com
28Fat Free CRM: Ruby On Rails-Based Open Source CRM Platform: http://www.fatfreecrm.com
29OpenEMR, The World’s Leading Open-Source Electronic Medical Record and Practice Management Software: https:
//www.open-emr.org
30Jeesite Rapid Development Platform: http://jeesite.com
31Create and Develop Your Business with PrestaShop: https://www.prestashop.com
32Mezzanine - The Best Django CMS: http://mezzanine.jupo.org
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We have installed each application and populated it with sample or demo data using an autopopulation
mechanism that was provided by the application, or we extracted sample data from a public demo instance
of that application. If there were multiple autopopulation options, we always picked the most complex
autopopulation scenario or the one dedicated to application testing. Afterwards, we have used the ZAP
spider with its default settings (sending both GET and POST forms, recursive traversal depth limit 5, no
limit on the number of children, accept cookies, send referrers, consider both parameter names and values)
for crawling the application with HTTP requests (we did not use the AJAX spider extensions, limiting
our analysis to standard requests). We provided the spider with log-in form requests and log-out criteria,
so that it could also access links that require authentication. Finally, we tweaked the web application and
spider settings in order to optimize the spider behavior for the particular application under test:
• In SuiteCRM we made the config.php file non-writable by the Apache user and blacklisted the
backup handling URL paths, because otherwise the spider restored an artificially generated invalid
backup of the database and destroyed the application.
• In Mezzanine we manually disabled the CSRF protection middleware in Django settings, because the
spider was not able to handle authentications protected by that middleware.
• In Jeesite we blacklisted the URL paths for user administration, because otherwise the spider would
change the password of the user under which it was logged in to a random value and stay logged off
for the rest of the crawl.
• In OpenEMR we manually rewrote the generated .htaccess files in order to enable directory listing,
because otherwise the spider was unable to discover a significant amount of original links.
• For OrchardCMS we completely disabled caching of ORM objects in order to force the application
to always fetch fresh values from the database.
After the spider crawled the application, we have backed up the generated ZAP context including
the list of original HTTP requests, the MariaDB database state of the application and the application
installation directory. We have restored the complete backup before each scan to prevent interference
between individual scans. An active scan with our plugin was started afterwards.
We have executed all the analyzed applications on a Fedora Linux server with an Intel Xeon E5345
CPU (4 cores, 8 threads, base clock 2.33 GHz) and 8 GB RAM. PHP applications were executed on Apache
2.4.25 with PHP version 7.0.25, Fat Free CRM was executed on Rails 5.1.6 with Ruby 2.4.4p296, Jeesite
was executed on Apache Tomcat 7.1.10 with OpenJDK 1.8.0 151 and Mezannine on Python 2.7.13 and
Django 1.11.15. For OrchardCMS we used a special deployment configuration. We have executed the
application inside a VirtualBox instance with Windows 10 Enterprise (1 core and 2GB RAM), in which we
have installed OrchardCMS using Microsoft Web Deploy 4.0. Further, we have configured it to connect over
TCP to the MariaDB database running on the Linux host machine together with ZAP and our analyzer
plugin. For OrchardCMS, we also needed to disable ORM caching to avoid reusing database fetch results
by the .NET runtime. Therefore, any interpretation of the performance metrics from the OrchardCMS
analysis should take into account this atypical deployment scenario.
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A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
Programming language PHP
C#
Razor
PHP
Ruby
HAML
PHP
Java
JSP
PHP
Python
Django
Version Oct 30 Nov 14 Oct 20 Oct 26 Oct 28 Oct 18 Nov 8 Nov 11
Lines of code 755k 249k 1050k 36k 794k 47k 406k 21k
Correct sanitizations 97 117 588 84 421 33 442 29
Incorrect sanitizations 22 3 31 20 83 11 29 8
Incorrectly classified
correct sanitizations (FP)
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Correct and incorrect sanitization instances summary. Version dates denote commits on master
branch and are all from 2018.
5.1 Analysis Results
The overall analysis results are given in Table 4. As a very basic observation, we can see that the analyzer
never misclassified a correct sanitization for an incorrect one, and identified a share of incorrect sanitizations
in every application. However, for an accurate understanding of the results, we need to delve further into
the classification of incorrect sanitizations. Because our analysis is motivated by possible security exploits,
it is essential to also determine whether a reported incorrect sanitization can be exploited and how. We do
this in Table 5, where the severity levels from Section 4.4 are combined with a manual post-hoc analysis
that distinguishes three situations – one when we have been able to exploit the identified flaw using only
the web application user interface, one when we have been able to exploit the flaw but only with direct
database access, and one when we did not manage to exploit the flaw, or where the flaw was clearly not
exploitable. Note that since manual analysis is involved (we only count flaws which we could exploit
ourselves), the numbers for manually exploited flaws are a conservative lower bound.
To summarize Table 5, the 207 cases of incorrect sanitization include 71 cases (34%) that were confirmed
as permitting arbitrary JavaScript execution through the user interface and 15 cases (7%) that permit
such execution only with direct database access. There were 105 cases (51%) that were confirmed as not
permitting arbitrary JavaScript execution. In 16 cases (8%) we did not find a manual exploit despite the
automated analysis reporting one may exist.
We can also view the numbers in Table 5 from a strictly practical security perspective, looking only at
the number of reports that have to be investigated. Our tool flagged 102 incorrect sanitization instances
as worthy of attention, with 79 classified as exploitable and 23 classified as possibly exploitable. Following
this report, a security expert would find that at least 70% of all the flagged flaws were XSS flaws exploitable
for arbitrary JavaScript execution, and the tool flagged 93% of those as such.
In our experience, the manual analysis of incorrect sanitization instances was mostly straightforward.
In the case of reflected XSS flaws, the analyst must manually verify those incorrectly sanitized values
that end up in JavaScript strings and check whether there is a dataflow path between the string and
the HTML output (unencoded backslashes can be used to encode an arbitrary HTML code using the
JavaScript \xHH encoding into the JavaScript string content). For stored XSS flaws, the analyst receives
a report that contains the URL, the source table name and the column name (for example table articles,
column title) the payload emitted on the output, and the browser context of the payload (displayed as
a comparison of unencoded and encoded string containing the escape characters). Given this data, the
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A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
Incorrect sanitizations reported as permitting JavaScript execution
manually exploited for arbitrary
JavaScript execution
5 1 3 1 37 5 12 2
manually exploited for arbitrary JavaScript
execution only when writing directly to
the database
6 0 2 0 4 1 0 0
manual exploit for arbitrary JavaScript
execution not found
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Incorrect sanitizations reported as possibly permitting JavaScript execution
manually exploited for arbitrary
JavaScript execution
0 1 1 0 2 0 1 0
manually exploited for arbitrary JavaScript
execution only when writing directly to
the database
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
manual exploit for arbitrary JavaScript
execution not found
0 0 5 0 8 0 3 0
Incorrect sanitizations reported as not permitting JavaScript execution
manually exploited for arbitrary
JavaScript execution
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
manually exploited for arbitrary JavaScript
execution only when writing directly to
the database
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
no exploit for arbitrary JavaScript
execution possible
11 1 19 19 31 5 13 6
Table 5: Automatically assigned severity vs manually investigated exploitability of incorrect sanitizations.
analyst can typically easily check whether the required escape character can be inserted into the relevant
database column, because most values can only be changed in a limited number of ways through the user
interface (for example changing the title of the article in the database column). In our evaluation, we
only had to consider multiple insertion methods in one case in SuiteCRM and in two cases in OpenEMR.
Automating this part of the analysis is, in our opinion, not feasible, because human understanding of the
logical application structure is crucial for the analysis.
For the interested reader we provide videos showing exploits of all 71 discovered XSS flaws that we
exploited with an arbitrary JavaScript execution.33 As a part of responsible disclosure, we have reported
all these exploits to the maintainers of the affected applications, all confirmed their acceptance more than
90 days ago. Some of the maintainers have applied for and received CVE records for the flaws that we
discovered in their applications (CVE-2018-1000842, CVE-2019-6261, CVE-2019-6264, CVE-2019-7741 or
CVE-2019-7744). We also reported the discovered XSS flaws to the maintainers of popular forks that
inherited the vulnerable code (for example, we reported the XSS flaws discovered in PrestaShop also to
33https://drive.google.com/open?id=1Wrr-OOxI7BE7cuFqjwQXAui3glFuvVrS
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Thirty Bees 34, because the Thirty Bees codebase was vulnerable as well). At the time of this writing, all
the flaws we have identified in Joomla, OrchardCMS, Fat Free CRM, Jeesite and Mezzanine, and some of
the flaws we have identified in OpenEMR and PrestaShop, were resolved.
To compare our prototype with the existing tools and to evaluate the overall usefulness, we will further
focus strictly on those (71) incorrect sanitization instances that are exploitable and allow an arbitrary
JavaScript execution without direct database access.
5.2 Discovered XSS Flaw Patterns
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
Reflected context-insensitive 0 0 0 0 5 0 7 0
Reflected context-sensitive 0 0 2 0 6 4 3 0
Stored context-insensitive 0 1 1 0 9 0 1 0
Stored context-sensitive 5 1 1 1 19 1 2 2
Table 6: Bug patterns of incorrect sanitizations exploitable with an arbitrary JavaScript execution.
Table 6 classifies the discovered XSS flaw patterns. The results confirm our assumption that the de-
tection of stored and context-sensitive XSS flaws is more impactful than the detection of reflected and
context-insensitive XSS flaws. While only two analyzed applications (OpenEMR and PrestaShop) con-
tained classical reflected context-insensitive XSS flaws that are covered by state-of-the-art blackbox XSS
scanners and by modern browser XSS prevention mechanisms, all eight analyzed applications contained
stored context-sensitive XSS flaws. Moreover, three of the analyzed applications (Joomla, Fat Free CRM
and Mezzanine CMS) contained only XSS flaws that are both stored and context-sensitive at the same
time.
5.3 Analysis Performance and Response Injection Granularity
Table 7 gives the basic performance metrics of our evaluation analysis when carried out with different
database response injection granularities, contrasted against the baseline of the default ZAP plugins for
reflected and stored XSS detection (version 33.0 of the Active scan rules in the ZAP extensions project35)
executed with parallelism level set to 5. Our choice of evaluated granularity levels was motivated by ease of
implementation – while we can come up with other combinations, we see no reason to believe any particular
combination should provide benefits broadly applicable across multiple applications.
Our analysis is always slower than the baseline but never prohibitively so. We attribute this to the
fact that our solution is single-threaded by design. If we want to retain the nearly blackbox character of
our analysis, the state of the database during request recording and response injection must be considered
global as we cannot differentiate between application request processing threads and match them to the
database requests. For certain frameworks (such as uWSGI), it should be possible to track the arriving
HTTP requests all the way to the database, but that would make our analysis platform dependent and
again violate the nearly blackbox character. The default ZAP plugins of the baseline allow conceptually
almost unlimited parallelism and therefore achieve lower average time per request.
34Thirty Bees Open Source eCommerce Platform - eCommerce That Works: https://thirtybees.com
35OWASP ZAP Addons: https://github.com/zaproxy/zap-extensions
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A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
Default ZAP plugins for reflected and stored XSS detection, v33.0
HTTP requests 583092 3826 95539 46818 240854 18225 49958 2532
Analysis time 13h56m 1h10m 4h49m 6h8m 11h46m 1h22m 3h44m 10m
XSS discoveries 0 0 0 0 7 0 8 0
Injecting individual fetches (specific table and column and value)
HTTP requests 179% 93% 148% 80% 173% 147% 98% 120%
Analysis time 699% 361% 572% 312% 677% 499% 383% 550%
XSS discoveries 5 2 4 1 39 5 13 2
Grouping all fetches from the same table and column (specific table and column)
HTTP requests 66% 57% 62% 53 % 68 % 55% 57% 57%
Analysis time 254% 226% 245% 212 % 268 % 188% 220% 280%
XSS discoveries 4 2 4 1 37 5 13 2
Grouping all fetches from the same table (specific table)
HTTP requests 53% 55% 56% 52% 54% 53% 52% 52%
Analysis time 208% 217% 216% 207% 211% 172% 204% 250%
XSS discoveries 3 1 1 0 32 5 13 2
Injecting all database fetches together
HTTP requests 51% 54% 55% 52% 51% 51% 51% 51%
Analysis time 201% 210% 211% 205% 198% 162% 198% 230%
XSS discoveries 0 1 1 0 22 4 11 1
Table 7: Performance statistics on different levels of response injection granularity. All XSS discovery
counts are absolute values, performance related values are absolute for baseline and relative to baseline
otherwise.
Table 7 also shows that the best recall was achieved with the finest granularity response injection. The
best ratio between the number of discovered XSS exploits and the analysis time was achieved when all
database fetch operations from the same table and column were intercepted together. This performance
advantage may increase with naturally populated applications, whose database tables may contain many
more rows than our autopopulated installations. However, even such small coarsening of response injection
granularity introduces missed XSS exploits.
5.4 Comparison with Existing XSS Scanners
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8
Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner 0 0 0 0 10 0 8 0
Burp Suite Professional 0 0 2 0 19 3 10 0
OWASP ZAP XSS plugins 0 0 0 0 7 0 8 0
Our ZAP plugin 5 2 4 1 39 5 13 2
Table 8: Comparison of XSS flaw counts as discovered by our analysis and three state-of-the-art blackbox
XSS scanners.
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For the comparative evaluation of our approach, we have again used the default OWASP ZAP ex-
tensions, along with two commercial products classified in an extensive blackbox web vulnerability com-
parison [8] among the highest ranking and relatively mutually orthogonal. Those are Burp Suite36 and
Acunetix.37. We have used the Active scan rules version 33.0 from OWASP ZAP extensions and Burp
Suite Professional 1.7.32.
We have provided Acunetix with the log-in sequences, Burp Suite with session definitions and both
applications with sitemaps generated by the ZAP spider. Afterwards, we have started scans aimed at the
detection of reflected and stored XSS flaws.
The comparison results are given in Table 8. PrestaShop and OpenEMR contained XSS flaws that
were discovered by all four scanners - mostly reflected context-insensitive XSS flaws. Our assumption that
popular and certified applications that handle security-sensitive data (here health records and purchase
records including credit card numbers) should not contain easily discoverable XSS flaws was incorrect in
those two cases. Notably, Burp Suite Professional scored on a subset of reflected context-sensitive XSS
flaws in SuiteCRM and Jeesite – these were insertions of HTML entity encoded GET or POST parameter
values into onevent handlers. Finally, the four remaining applications (Joomla, OrchardCMS, Fat Free
CRM and Mezzanine) could claim state-of-the-art level of security, because OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite and
Acunetix did not find any XSS flaws in them. It is worth mentioning that Acunetix has special support
for detection of XSS flaws in Joomla and even scans Joomla using a database of fingerprints that identify
security bugs discovered in Joomla in the past38 39.
Our ability to find XSS flaws in Joomla, OrchardCMS, Fat Free CRM and Mezzanine, which the other
scanners all declared free of XSS flaws, indicates that our approach surpasses the state-of-the-art level of
blackbox XSS security testing in the ability to detect stored and context-sensitive XSS flaws.
6 Related Work
We are not aware of any existing tools that shortcut the dataflow analysis of stored XSS flaws by intercepting
the communication with the database while avoiding whitebox analysis of the web application. However,
existing solutions may share isolated aspects of our approach – some intercept the database traffic, some
avoid whitebox analysis, some detect context-sensitive XSS flaws. In each of the following subsections we
focus on one shared aspect.
6.1 Database Traffic Interception
Sentinel [17] is similar to our approach because of its focus on the interface between a web application
and its database. It works in two modes. In the learning mode Sentinel observes the typical application
execution workflow and extracts a set of invariants from the SQL queries that are generated by the web
application. Eventually, Sentinel is switched from the learning mode to the testing mode. Then, when
the application generates an SQL query that violates the extracted invariants, the query is identified as a
potential attack attempt and rejected. However, we handle the interface between a web application and
36Burp Suite Scanner - PortSwigger: https://portswigger.net/burp
37Website Security - Keep in Check with Acunetix: http://www.acunetix.com
38Joomla! Ensures Website Security with Acunetix: https://www.acunetix.com/vulnerability-scanner/cs_joomla
39Joomla Vulnerability Scanner: Enter Acunetix!: https://www.acunetix.com/vulnerability-scanner/
joomla-vulnerability-scanner
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its database very differently from Sentinel. We do not merely observe the communication between the web
application and the database, but also actively modify the traffic. Our approach also works on a lower
level of the software stack. We do not analyze the SQL language or any of its dialects, and instead operate
directly on the network protocol between the web application and the database. Therefore, we support also
applications using ORM or other alternative interfaces instead of SQL. An approach similar to Sentinel is
also used by BLOCK [16]. It also works in a learning and a testing mode. BLOCK operates on a higher
level of abstraction than Sentinel, but it is limited to state violation attacks. It finds and enforces invariants
over session identifier variables instead of SQL queries.
6.2 Non-Whitebox Detection of XSS Vulnerabilities
In [21], Parvez et al. tested three state-of-the-art blackbox analyzers on a relatively simple stored context-
insensitive XSS flaw without any non-trivial obstacles (such as JavaScript, captchas or complex form value
consistency checks) and found that even this simple scenario presented a big challenge for the tested black-
box XSS scanners. Benchmarking of eight state-of-the-art blackbox XSS scanners done by Bau et al. in [3]
showed that all tested XSS scanners were quite successful when looking for reflected XSS vulnerabilities,
but their ability to detect stored XSS vulnerabilities was considerably weaker. An even more systematic
benchmarking of eleven state-of-the-art blackbox XSS scanners presented by Doupe et al. in [8] led to the
same conclusions. All three sources show that our approach exceeds the state-of-the-art level of blackbox
XSS testing by removing the gap between reflected XSS flaw and stored XSS flaw detection.
Multiple previous attempts tried to increase the effectiveness of blackbox XSS scanners. Classical web
crawlers assume that web applications are stateless. This assumption is obviously unsound from the security
perspective. The state-aware blackbox scanner [7] presented again by Doupe et al. tries to heuristically
infer the state of the web application (e.g. when the user is logged in, the web application is in a different
state than when the user is logged out) and cover the web application URLs in all possible web application
states. This approach was evaluated on eight web applications, showing better detection capabilities on two
of those applications when compared with classical stateless blackbox scanners. Pellegrino and Balzarotti
in [22] use a similar approach in order to detect logical security flaws in web applications (examples of
logical flaws are a possibility to shop in an online shop without paying or a possibility to change the
administrator password without being logged in as an administrator).
6.3 Non-Whitebox Detection of Context-Sensitive XSS Vulnerabilities
Non-whitebox detection of context-sensitive XSS flaws is performed by Burp Suite,40 which we used in
the evaluation section. Burp Suite is a proprietary software which supports HTML decoding and is able
to detect some sanitization mismatches like inserting HTML-entity encoded input values into JavaScript
onevent handlers.41 However, it does not have general support for detecting mismatches of encoding
algorithms and browser contexts. For example, when the user input is URL encoded and ends up in a
javascript: scheme URL, Burp does not find it, even though it is exploitable for an arbitrary JavaScript
execution.
40Burp Suite: https://portswigger.net/burp
41XSS: Beating HTML Sanitization Filters: Event Handlers: https://support.portswigger.net/customer/en/portal/
articles/2590822-xss-beating-html-sanitization-filters-event-handlers
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KameleonFuzz [9] is a blackbox fuzzer of web applications which uses browser parsing for context
sensitivity. KameleonFuzz uses model inference for the detection of control flow and taint flow and a
genetic algorithm (called evolutionary fuzzing) for the generation of exploit payloads. Tripp et al. [30] use
a learning approach to blackbox testing. Their solution uses a very large space of attacking payloads and
prunes this space using feedback from the failed exploitation attempts. This approach is also context-
sensitive because it parses HTML pages and performs syntactic analysis over input points (e.g. HTTP
parameters). The blackbox XSS detection approach described in [4] proposes new quality metrics for
XSS vulnerability scanners. The approach was evaluated on an experimental testbed that contained only
reflected XSS flaws and its authors came to a conclusion that existing blackbox XSS scanners have limited
context awareness when choosing a potential exploit payload.
6.4 Whitebox Detection of Context-Sensitive XSS Vulnerabilities
Among the related work that focuses on systematic context-sensitive XSS detection, but does not use the
blackbox approach, we have DjangoChecker [27]. DjangoChecker is a dynamic whitebox analyzer that
instruments the application under analysis and runs on the HTTP server side. Because of the whitebox
character, DjangoChecker’s implementation is bound to a specific web application runtime. Similarly to
our approach it uses recursive parsing of the HTTP response bodies for the detection of web browser
contexts.
A whitebox tool with a purpose similar to DjangoChecker is SCRIPTGARD [25]. SCRIPTGARD aims
at dynamically autocorrecting sanitizations in legacy applications. It works in two phases. During the
training phase, it computes correct sanitizations and builds a sanitization cache that maps each execution
path to sanitization algorithms. During the production phase, if SCRIPTGARD encounters an execution
path that is already in the sanitization cache, it applies a matching sanitization. Otherwise, the associated
request is either blocked or allowed to proceed unchecked. The training phase can be used as a separate
analyzer.
A combination of static and dynamic whitebox analysis is performed by the Context-Sensitive Autosan-
itization (CSAS) approach [23]. CSAS works with templating languages that generate HTML output, and
first attempts to determine the web browser context of unsafe values statically using type qualifiers. If the
static computation succeeds, proper sanitization is hardcoded during compilation of the template. Other-
wise, CSAS generates a runtime check, which determines the web browser context dynamically. The CSAS
approach is useful for applications developed from scratch, however, it is limited to a class of sufficiently
restricted templates. Navex [2] also combines static and dynamic analysis of PHP code in order to auto-
matically generate XSS exploits. It does not check browser contexts, but it validates sanitizer correctness
similarly to our work. Navex has a different purpose than our scanner, because it automatically constructs
exploits for the identified vulnerabilities. A purely static whitebox approach towards the detection of
context-sensitive XSS flaws is JspChecker [26], which analyzes JSP applications. Similarly to our work it
recursively parses HTML outputs in order to compute web browser contexts.
The existing approaches towards context-sensitive XSS flaw detection rely on the ability to trace data
flows inside the web application. That is why they cannot be used by non-whitebox scanners. Our approach
is novel, because it does not have the dataflow analysis requirement but still handles context sensitive XSS
(we detect the exploit payload post-hoc using regular expression matching and simulate browser decoding
in order to verify the sanitization).
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A systematic analysis of XSS sanitization in web application frameworks in [31] does not propose
any particular approach towards context-sensitive XSS flaw detection. However, it succinctly describes
subtleties and challenges in context-sensitive XSS sanitization and statistics of context-sensitive XSS bug-
patterns in real-world web applications. Those statistics roughly correspond to our own observations during
the evaluation of our approach.
7 Conclusion
We have presented an approach to XSS analysis that advances the state-of-the-art by detecting XSS
flaws that are stored or context-sensitive or both. The approach relies on moving the database out of the
blackbox (a feasible step given that many databases are standalone processes connected to web applications
through documented protocols), and coordinates the exploit payload injection between the analyzer and
the database. Furthermore, the approach uses flexible exploit payload identification based on regular
expression matching, coupled with browser context analysis, to identify even encoded instances of the
exploit payload.
Our approach is highly practical – it was evaluated on eight mature and technologically diverse web
applications, and succeeded in identifying highly severe stored context-sensitive XSS flaws in all of them.
Furthermore, the analysis was done in reasonable time and with high precision – out of 79 incorrect saniti-
zation instances flagged by our approach as permitting arbitrary JavaScript execution, we have manually
demonstrated exploitability through the web application’s user interface in 66 cases. We have further
demonstrated that three state-of-the-art blackbox scanners fail to detect these same vulnerabilities, and
are in fact not systematically effective against stored and context-sensitive XSS flaws. We have reported
a total of 71 manually verified flaws that permit arbitrary JavaScript executions to the application main-
tainers, some are listed in the CVE database, most are also already resolved.
We are currently implementing a proxy server to wrap mainstream database protocols (MySQL, Post-
greSQL, MSSQL and Oracle) with the request reporting and response injection support. This will allow
us to encapsulate the database in a wrapper implemented in Java and distributed along with our ZAP
plugin, instead of the current solution that modifies an existing database implementation. This will allow
us to intercept traffic to non open-source databases (Microsoft SQL Server or Oracle Database).
We see perspective future work in the implementation of dataflow analysis for JavaScript string con-
tent [14, 10, 6]. Connecting our current technique together with the dataflow analysis will lead to systematic
detection of a new class of XSS flaws which might be widespread in popular applications. Detection of
JavaScript-embedded languages can also be connected with DOM XSS detection [28, 20].
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